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INTRODUCTION
The critical time horizon for most American lay-investors is the
length of their career. Today’s America is one in which workers are losing
significant financial assistance from pensions or Social Security, and so
they must save—and invest those savings—in their own retirement
accounts. The challenges of this project are enormous. As a population,
Americans save too little and invest what little they do save unwisely. The
explanations for these shortcomings are numerous: our educational system
offers little coherent financial education to investors, and the task of saving
is not one at which people can easily become experts on their own. As
Richard Thaler has noted, wryly, humans do not have many ways to
improve at this project because “when it comes to saving for retirement,
barring reincarnation we do that exactly once.”1
Though not every financial observer believes the United States will
soon face problematic shortfalls in our system of saving,2 a great many
do.3 Data on the income and assets of America’s retirees reveal a complex
picture of a heterogeneous population. Today, older Americans are, in
* Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. For their helpful questions and comments, I thank
the participants of the Public Law & Legal Theory Workshop at the University of Chicago Law School
and the participants of the 2017 Law and Entrepreneurship Association Retreat at Berkeley Law
School.
1. RICHARD H. THALER, MISBEHAVING: THE MAKING OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 50 (2016).
2. See, e.g., Andrew G. Biggs, New Evidence on the Phony “Retirement Crisis,” WALL ST. J.
(Jan. 4, 2016, 7:10 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-evidence-on-the-phony-retirement-crisis1451952646 (arguing that data released by the Congressional Budget Office in December 2015
suggest that Social Security’s “promised benefit levels are far more adequate than is often portrayed”).
3. See, e.g., CHARLES ELLIS, ALICIA MUNNELL & ANDREW ESCHTRUTH, FALLING SHORT: THE
COMING RETIREMENT CRISIS AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2014); Saul Levmore, Inequality and the
Elderly Poor, in AGING THOUGHTFULLY: CONVERSATIONS ABOUT RETIREMENT, ROMANCE,
WRINKLES, AND REGRET 182, 182–94 (Oxford Univ. Press 2017) (proposing “a bold expansion of
Social Security” to “make a great majority of Americans, including the elderly poor of the future,
much better off”).
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aggregate, a wealthy cohort, flush with a lifetime of savings and buoyed
by a felicitous rise in real estate values. Yet, four million elderly
Americans are individually poor.
The circumstances of the impending ten-year cohort of workers
preparing to retire, those aged fifty-five to sixty-four, however, is clearer:
they enjoy a lower incidence of defined benefit pensions and markedly
fewer personal savings. They and those who will follow them—many with
no savings whatsoever—are headed for more serious financial difficulties.
Large numbers of people will have to work many more years than
expected, often in difficult jobs, while enduring impoverished retirements.
Possible solutions to this problem generally fall into three broad
categories: (1) expand defined benefits, such as by buttressing or
expanding Social Security4 or by introducing “guaranteed retirement
accounts”;5 (2) increase personal savings by using behavioral techniques
to enroll workers automatically in 401(k) accounts, to contribute
automatically to those accounts, and to select default investments other
than cash;6 and (3) do nothing out of indifference or disagreement with the
existence or magnitude of the problem.
My focus is upon the second approach: increasing personal savings
by improving our current system of defined contribution accounts.
Existing behavioral work on enhancing accumulation through automatic
enrollment and automatic escalation is insightful, effective, and already
comprehensive. Yet, even if we successfully implement these proposals
and amass greater savings, the resulting investments and their future
earning potential may nevertheless be squandered due to shortcomings
within existing defined contribution plans and our inexpert use of them.
In this Article, I consider possible approaches that attempt to improve
the plans through which millions of Americans tend to their life savings. I
begin by considering the inadequacies of our current system of defined
contribution accounts and then address two possible alternatives: the first
being a federal account universally available to Americans based largely
on the model of the Thrift Savings Plan; the second being a system of statebased retirement accounts like those that have already been developed in
a handful of states. Though I conclude that a single, federal plan would be

4. See, e.g., Levmore, supra note 3, at 182–85.
5. See TERESA GHILDARDUCCI & HAMILTON JAMES, A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN TO CONFRONT
THE RETIREMENT SAVINGS CRISIS 6 (2016), http://www.economicpolicyresearch.org/images/
Retirement_Project/Retirement_Security_Guaranteed_digital.pdf [https://perma.cc/C2NC-5LEH].
6. See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 108–10 (2009).

2018]

Federalism of Personal Finance

369

superior, either alternative approach would be an improvement over our
current system.
I.

PROBLEMS WITH DEFINED CONTRIBUTION ACCOUNTS

Like the complaint of Woody Allen’s two elderly women talking
about the food at a Catskill mountain resort, a significant problem with
401(k) plans is that they may be both “really terrible” and available in
“such small portions.”7 That is, while many 401(k) plans suffer from a
litany of shortcomings, over 68 million Americans work for employers
who offer no retirement plan whatsoever (and thus enjoy no access to
valuable tax savings).8
Both academic work by scholars, such as Ian Ayres and Quinn
Curtis, and recent litigation by firms, such as Schlichter Bogard & Denton,
have identified a variety of problems in defined contribution plans. In their
2015 study, Ayres and Curtis argued that fees and menu offerings in many
401(k) plans “lead to a cost of seventy-eight basis points in excess of index
funds.”9 “Fees are so high” in sixteen percent of the plans Ayres and Curtis
analyzed “they consume[d] the tax benefits of investing in a 401(k) for a
young employee.”10
Similarly, Schlichter Bogard has alleged a suite of other problems
with employer contribution plans in lawsuits against Lockheed Martin,
Boeing, and John Deere, and more recently against major universities,
such as Massachusetts Institute of Technology, New York University, and
Yale University.11 Specifically, Schlichter Bogard alleged excessive
administrative costs, the inclusion of unnecessarily expensive share
classes of mutual funds, too many fund choices, and selections of
conflicted investment advisors.12 If these allegations are true, the
administrators of the employers’ plans certainly have made poor—and
easily avoidable—choices on behalf of their employees.
Certainly, the state of defined contribution plans in the United States
could be improved. Indeed, even if one does not believe there is a current
7. ANNIE HALL (United Artists 1977), http://www.dailyscript.com/scripts/annie_hall.html
[https://perma.cc/8UAL-XAQK].
8. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET: STATE SAVINGS PROGRAMS FOR NON-GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES 1 (Nov. 16, 2015), https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/ouractivities/
resource-center/fact-sheets/state-savings-programs-for-non-government-employees.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/Z2RJ-2SAE].
9. Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, Beyond Diversification: The Pervasive Problem of Excessive Fees
and “Dominated Funds” in 401(k) Plans, 124 YALE L.J. 1476, 1481 (2015).
10. Id.
11. See Tara Siegel Bernard, M.I.T., N.Y.U. and Yale Are Sued Over Retirement Plan Fees, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 10, 2016, at B1; see, e.g., Hecker v. Deere, 556 F.3d 575 (7th Cir. 2009).
12. See Bernard, supra note 11.
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or impending retirement crisis, improvements to our system of saving
could—costs and benefits permitting—be a welcome boon to millions of
Americans.
II. PROPOSAL I: CREATE A NATIONAL THRIFT SAVINGS PLAN
An ideal defined contribution plan would be one managed by an
experienced investment advisor offering a limited selection of high-quality
investments at low fees. Happily, such a plan already exists: the Thrift
Savings Plan (TSP).13
The TSP is the defined contribution plan for federal employees; 4.9
million14 of whom use it to invest an aggregate of $495 billion.15 The plan
is managed by the world’s largest private asset manager, BlackRock,
which offers ten prudent investment options and charges an average fee of
just 3.8 basis points.16 For comparison, the average 401(k) fee that private
sector employees currently pay is sixty-seven basis points.17
I reiterate my proposal that we allow all American workers to invest
in the TSP.18 Or, if current TSP participants object to the rise in fees that
such an influx of participants would inevitably cause, then I propose we
create another federal plan just like it (which we can call TSP-II).
A. Implementation
To implement this proposal, Congress could use its constitutional
power to regulate interstate commerce to amend the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 with the addition of a few salient provisions.
First, employers of more than a de minimis number of employees—
say, five—would be required to enroll their employees automatically in
TSP-II accounts unless those employees opt out of the plan. Accordingly,
the universe of covered employers could be either just those who do not

13. THRIFT SAVINGS FUND, FINANCIAL STATEMENTS: DECEMBER 31, 2016 AND 2015 (2017),
https://www.tsp.gov/PDF/formspubs/financial-stmt.pdf [https://perma.cc/TY4S-SF83].
14. Id. at 6.
15. Id. at 4.
16. See WILLIAM A. BIRDTHISTLE, EMPIRE OF THE FUND: THE WAY WE SAVE NOW 214 (2016);
Stephen Foley, BlackRock Assets Under Management Hit $5.4tn on Record ETF Inflows, FIN. TIMES
(Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/adeae206-2502-11e7-8691-d5f7e0cd0a16 (noting that
BlackRock is “[t]he world’s largest asset manager, with $5.42tn under management at the end of
March [2017]”); THRIFT SAVINGS FUND, supra note 13.
17. See Liam Pleven, 401(k) Fees: What is Reasonable?, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 20, 2015, 4:52 PM),
https://blogs.wsj.com/totalreturn/2015/02/20/401k-fees-what-is-reasonable/.
18. See generally BIRDTHISTLE, supra note 16, at 212–18.
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offer their own retirement plan (who, again, employ 68 million workers)19
or all employers (with 124 million full-time and 27 million part-time
employees).20 Alternatively, TSP-II implementation could begin with a
narrower category of employers and, if successful, subsequently expand
to the broader one.
After enrollment, covered employers would submit, together with
their usual tax withholdings, regular default contributions of three percent
of each employee’s salary to TSP-II. Like the TSP, employers would be
permitted—but not required—to match contributions in line with existing
limits. As a default, funds in each employee’s TSP-II account would be
invested in a target-date fund keyed to their projected retirement date.
Over time, the employees’ contributions would automatically and
incrementally escalate from the initial three percent figure until they reach
a cap of ten percent. Employees could, of course, decline to participate in
TSP-II or change each of these settings.
Unemployed or self-employed workers who wish to participate could
enroll directly in TSP-II and link their bank accounts to deposit
contributions automatically in their TSP-II account. On issues of tax
deferment and withdrawals, TSP-II savings would be treated in the same
manner as all assets in 401(k) plans. Should employees lose or change
jobs, they would maintain their existing TSP-II account.
The new plan would be overseen by the Federal Retirement Thrift
Investment Board, which currently administers the existing TSP.21 Or, if
that board objected to these additional duties, a new body could be
constituted with oversight of TSP-II, following the TSP model. Investment
management and administrative services (such as furnishing account
statements, maintaining websites, staffing toll-free telephone numbers,
and providing the usual complement of tasks required by individual
accounts) could, as is the case with the TSP, be outsourced to private
vendors.22
B. Potential Benefits
1. Prudent Investment Options
For at least two possible reasons, many defined contribution plans
offer participants a menu with poor investment options—options that are
19. See Carol Hymowitz, The 401(k) Crisis is Getting Worse, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 21, 2015, 7:32
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-21/bad-math-68-million-americans-no401-k-epic-savings-crisis.
20. Economic News Release: Table A-9. Selected Employment Indicators, BUREAU LAB. STAT.,
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t09.htm [https://perma.cc/5MG4-TZ2Y].
21. See generally THRIFT SAVINGS FUND, supra note 13.
22. See generally id.
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unsuitable for the project of long-term investing, unnecessarily expensive,
or simply too numerous. The first reason is simply a lack of sophistication
on the part of the employer. A company may not internally possess the
investment expertise necessary to make good choices for their plans or to
evaluate the choices proposed by third-party vendors.
The second reason is that an employer may receive compensation
from vendors in exchange for the inclusion of inferior investment options.
If, for instance, an employer agrees to hire, say, Fidelity to administer the
company’s 401(k) plan, and Fidelity includes a number of expensive
Fidelity funds in the plan’s menu, Fidelity might then agree to share a
portion of the revenue it earns as the advisor of those funds with the
employer. Such arrangements exist and have been litigated.23
Highly specialized, undiversified, and expensive funds are, one
hopes, self-evidently bad choices for workers attempting to save prudently
over a several-decade time horizon. Perhaps less obviously, the inclusion
of too many choices on a 401(k) menu is also imprudent. Studies have
demonstrated that offering too many options to consumers—including
investors—can have a stultifying effect on the purported beneficiaries.24
One analysis has found that for every ten additional choices included on a
401(k) menu, participation in the plan drops by 1.5%–2%.25 According to
the study, the average plan with thirty options yielded a participation rate
of seventy percent, but when those options were increased to fifty-six,
participation fell to sixty-one percent.26
The TSP offers just ten investment options: five target-date funds,
four broad-based index funds, and one fund invested exclusively in
Treasury securities.27 Hewing to that model, TSP-II would provide access
to such a prudent array of choices for a massive number of Americans.
Indeed, a universal TSP-II would allow employees to reject their
employer’s plan menu, if it were inferior, in favor of these choices.
2. Professional & Monitored Management
While the TSP may be easily derided or dismissed as simply “a
government plan” (with all the stigma that appellation carries in certain
quarters) management of the TSP’s investments is decidedly not
“government work.” BlackRock, the firm that currently serves as the TSP
23. See, e.g., Hecker v. Deere, 556 F.3d 575 (7th Cir. 2009).
24. See, e.g., Sheena S. Iyengar, Wei Jiang & Gur Huberman, How Much Choice is Too Much?
Contributions to 401(k) Retirement Plans, in PENSION DESIGN AND STRUCTURE: NEW LESSONS FROM
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 83 (Olivia S. Mitchell & Stephen P. Utkus eds., 2004).
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See THRIFT SAVINGS FUND, supra note 13.
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advisor, professionally manages over five trillion dollars28 and enjoys a
sterling reputation in the private sector investing community. Should the
performance of TSP-II’s funds ever lapse, the plan’s oversight board could
replace BlackRock with an alternative top-flight private asset manager.
And since the plan’s ten funds are uncomplicated and, in several cases,
just simple index funds, each fund’s performance is readily comparable to
other such funds offered by other large advisors, such as Vanguard and
Fidelity.
Moreover, because TSP-II would include millions of participants and
have a high public profile, the performance of its manager would be
subject to close public scrutiny. Beneath the gaze of thousands or millions
of interested participants, managers have a harder time getting away with
shoddy work. That scrutiny would extend beyond the simple performance
of the funds and into less obvious management behavior, such as whether
the advisor is churning fund assets to accumulate private gains with the
brokers executing such trades; overweighting equity holdings in targetdate funds to earn the higher fees associated with underlying equity (rather
than fixed income) investments; overvaluing any illiquid assets in the
funds’ portfolios to inflate the fees it receives as a percentage of assets
under management; or selectively disclosing the funds’ future trades to
preferred outside clients with intentions of front-running TSP-II’s trades.29
In contrast, our current system—comprising thousands of private
defined contribution plans—gives participants fewer incentives, less
information, and weaker market power to police such unfaithful behavior
by investment managers.
3. Low Fees
Perhaps the most obvious and significant benefit of a TSP-II would
be the enormous potential savings that millions of investors could enjoy
from dramatically lower fees.
Would TSP-II achieve fees as low as the 3.8 basis points in TSP?30
Perhaps not. The low fees TSP boasts are a function of several factors that
are unique to the TSP and may not exist in a TSP-II, at least not
immediately. First, the TSP boasts huge economies of scale,31 and while a
28. See Foley, supra note 16.
29. See BIRDTHISTLE, supra note 16 (discussing these potential problems in funds and selfdealing behavior by investment advisors).
30. Expense Ratios, THRIFT SAVINGS PLAN, https://www.tsp.gov/InvestmentFunds/Funds
Overview/expenseRatio.html [https://perma.cc/PKS3-AAF5].
31. See generally INV. CO. INST., THE FEDERAL THRIFT SAVINGS PLAN: CAN IT BE DUPLICATED?
(2015) [hereinafter THE FEDERAL THRIFT SAVINGS PLAN], https://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_tsp.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C9FQ-H68Z].
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TSP-II could grow to encompass a far greater number of participants and
assets over time, it would not do so immediately. One should expect low
average balances in the accounts of a TSP-II in its initial years until
participants accumulate more substantial savings. Also, the members of
TSP are all, by definition, federal employees (many of whom enjoy
comparatively healthy salaries32) while a substantial percentage of TSP-II
participants might be underemployed or low-salaried workers. Another
relative advantage of TSP is the administrative efficiency that comes from
its participants all working for a single employer with standardized
policies, standardized procedures, and a common infrastructure,33 an
advantage that would not be true in a TSP-II involving many different
employers. Finally, and perhaps most saliently, significant TSP
administrative duties are performed by employees on the federal payroll
and thus are not borne by the plan itself,34 an arrangement that also might
not be true in a TSP-II.
On the other hand, TSP-II would cover a universe of possible
participants far larger than the 4.8 million in TSP. But if we assume TSPII included only the unemployed, the self-employed, or employees of
employers without plans, their average income—and thus the plan’s per
capita account size—might always remain lower than TSP and thus less
efficient. Over time, however, the significantly larger number of
participants would be likely to accumulate larger aggregate savings. And,
if TSP-II were instead available to all Americans, the plan would surely
grow far larger than TSP. So, perhaps a TSP-II could someday enjoy fees
even lower than 3.8 basis points. Consider also that investment advisors
such as Vanguard already offer exchange-traded funds and mutual funds
to retail investors and modestly sized institutions at rates not much higher
than 3.8 basis points.35 Indeed, were America’s defined contribution plans
to make far wider use of such investment offerings, the need for changes
to our retirement system would be far lower. Unfortunately, they do not.
In any event, the relevant comparison is to the fees employees
currently pay in the plans of private employers, which are vastly higher36
than TSP and, in any fair forecast, the TSP-II.

32. Plan Participation, THRIFT SAVINGS PLAN, https://www.tsp.gov/PlanParticipation/index.
html [https://perma.cc/N3LC-N5YJ].
33. THE FEDERAL THRIFT SAVINGS PLAN, supra note 31, at 1.
34. Id. at 2.
35. See Vanguard Mutual Funds, VANGUARD GROUP (Sept. 30, 2017), https://investor.
vanguard.com/mutual-funds/list#/mutual-funds/asset-class/month-end-returns
[https://perma.cc/
94ND-VPRV].
36. INV. CO. INST., 2017 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK: A REVIEW OF TRENDS AND
ACTIVITIES IN THE INVESTMENT COMPANY INDUSTRY 89 fig. 5.1 (2017), https://www.ici.org/
pdf/2017_factbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/2MEY-MA82].
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4. Proof of Concept & Political Feasibility
The success of TSP is widely admired, and it serves as a successful
proof of concept for TSP-II. Certainly, TSP-II would be more complicated
by the inclusion of participants from so many different employers or from
no employers at all. Yet, enrollment and participation in our current,
heterogeneous landscape of private sector-defined contribution plans is
easily managed electronically through websites and smartphone
applications. With the preparation of enrollment and management
websites, one can easily envision how the implementation of TSP-II could
take place throughout the United States.
This plan is also more politically feasible in the short term—
particularly under unified Republican control of the federal government—
than any other plans to boost retirement accounts, particularly by
increasing Social Security benefits. Indeed, the only presidential candidate
to propose any retirement plan similar to this idea was a Republican:
Marco Rubio.37 Other similar proposals have come from the Center for
American Progress Action Fund38 and U.S. Senator Jeff Merkley (DOR),39 which suggests that a TSP-II could conceivably enjoy bipartisan
support.
5. TSP-II as Public Infrastructure
A federal retirement plan could serve as a public good with benefits
for private citizens and businesses like highways, railroads, public
education, and other governmental infrastructure. If TSP-II became a
reality, many American employers might choose to reduce corporate
expenditures by dropping their own retirement plans and opting to
participate in TSP-II.

37. Josh Hicks, Rubio, Retirement Benefits and a Thrift Savings Plan for All Americans, WASH.
POST (May 14, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal-eye/wp/2014/05/14/
rubio-retirement-benefits-and-a-thrift-savings-plan-for-all-americans/?utm_term=.1f3eb6b2b0b8
[https://perma.cc/8PA7-LFKU].
38. David Madland, Alex Rowell,& Rowland Davis, Improving Americans’ Retirement
Outcomes Through the National Savings Plan, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS ACTION FUND (Jan. 28,
2016),
https://www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/economy/reports/2016/01/28/128146/
improving-americans-retirement-outcomes-through-the-national-savings-plan/
[https://perma.cc/
AB83-B6TN].
39. Press Release, Office of Senator Jeff Merkley, Merkley Introduces Major New Retirement
Security Legislation to Give Every Worker Access to a Retirement Savings Plan (Jan. 28, 2016),
https://www.merkley.senate.gov/news/press-releases/merkley-introduces-major-new-retirementsecurity-legislation-to-give-every-worker-access-to-a-retirement-savings-plan
[https://perma.cc/
8EVT-6428]. The Merkley proposal is also supported by U.S. Representatives Suzanne Bonamici (DOR) and Jared Huffman (D-CA). See Kellie Lunney, Members of Congress Really Seem to Like the
TSP, GOV’T EXECUTIVE (June 28, 2016), http://www.govexec.com/pay-benefits/2016/06/memberscongress-really-seem-tsp/129465/ [https://perma.cc/W5MW-C9WD].
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To the extent that employers wish to compete more aggressively in
the labor market, they could, of course, offer their own, more generous
plans. Or they could choose an interim position, in which they offer no
plan of their own but match a portion of their employees’ contributions to
TSP-II. So, though there would be costs with automatically enrolling
employees in the plan, those costs would likely be lower than managing a
private plan for the employer and could be paid for out of plan assets.
6. Data
A large-scale retirement plan operated for the public good could also
produce a tremendous flow of data that could be used to help citizens save
more effectively for their retirement. For instance, if TSP-II engaged in
A/B testing of its electronic interfaces, it might learn which presentations
of information lead to greater rates of participation, contribution, and
overall saving. Like Facebook, Amazon, Google, and the most effective
private sector companies, TSP-II’s high volume of users would generate
an enormous and important amount of testable information.
TSP-II could use that data to improve services for its own
participants, of course. And, as a public program, it could also provide
those findings freely to private sector plan administrators or, indeed, to
other government agencies (such as the Securities and Exchange
Commission or the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau), which could,
in turn, consider mandating the implementation of successful approaches.
Using and collecting this data is both possible and feasible because
firms like Vanguard currently enjoy huge volumes of investors and assets
and possess the ability to produce and process massive amounts of useful
investment data.40 But, as private enterprises, their incentive is more likely
to find ways of maximizing their profits, which may not be consistent with
better retirement savings by the public at large. A firm that discovered
ways to encourage investors to trade frequently might, for instance,
generate profits sufficient to offset the reduced performance in those
investors’ accounts. TSP-II, and indeed TSP, should and could compile
and analyze its data for more publicly beneficial lessons.

40. See, e.g., VANGUARD, HOW AMERICA SAVES 2017 (2017), https://pressroom.vanguard.com/
nonindexed/How-America-Saves-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/K64A-M3U3] (encompassing a 110page annual report based on Vanguard’s defined contribution data).
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C. Potential Drawbacks
1. Monopsony
If a government plan such as TSP-II were to suck up billions or
trillions of dollars in retirement savings and deliver them into the hands of
BlackRock, or any single asset manager, the broader investment industry
could suffer competitively. The TSP-II manager, with its incredible
concentration of assets, might dominate and possibly drive out
competition. Indeed, the industry’s fear of this outcome—and their
lobbying efforts to prevent it41—might explain the conspicuous absence of
a TSP-II, even after thirty years of TSP success. Of course, the investing
public might also worry that, as with any monopsony, should competition
in the investing industry wither or disappear, the fees in a captured TSP-II
could then rise dramatically in the future.
This concern could be alleviated with a few adjustments. First, the
manager of TSP-II could be rotated every few years, as the Sarbanes–
Oxley Act requires of corporate accountants.42 New managers could
participate in an auction for the right to manage the plan for two or three
years and then relinquish the role to another firm. Such substitutions
might, however, inflict transition costs, investor confusion, or simple
uncertainty. Nevertheless, the benefits of rotating the administrator to
prevent complacent abuse of the position could outweigh the transition
costs.
Alternatively, a more efficient and feasible option would be for the
overall manager to retain the services of numerous sub-advisors for several
of the plan’s funds. This sub-advisory structure is common in the private
sector, with major fund families such as Vanguard holding auctions
amongst other investment advisors for the financially rewarding privilege
of advising massive Vanguard funds.43 The system allows the overall
manager to operate with low costs since bidders, eager for the business
opportunity, routinely offer to manage the funds at rates far lower than
standard retail or institutional levels.44 It also allows the manager to
assemble a “best-of-breed” array of funds, in which sub-advisors with
particular expertise in, say, equities manage the equity fund, while another
41. See, e.g., Letter from Paul Schott Stevens, President & CEO, Inv. Co. Inst., to The Honorable
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Governor of Cal. (Aug. 8, 2016), https://www.ici.org/pdf/
16_ici_ca_secure_choice.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NC7-ZBRU].
42. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2012).
43. See generally DANIEL WALLICK ET AL., VANGUARD, THE CASE FOR VANGUARD ACTIVE
MANAGEMENT: SOLVING THE LOW-COST/TOP-TALENT PARADOX? (2013), https://www.vanguard.
com/pdf/s356.pdf [https://perma.cc/DJ3E-XHMP].
44. Id.
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shop particularly knowledgeable about bonds manages the fixed-income
fund.
Of course, many trillions of dollars in the United States and around
the world are invested completely outside of the 401(k) system.45 So, even
were TSP-II to enjoy great success, that success would be confined to
retirement savings alone; conversely, any substantial harm to the broader
investment industry due to centralized TSP-II management would be only
marginal.
2. Governmental Endorsement
Any government plan—particularly one controlling trillions of
private dollars—is likely to be resisted by many simply because of the
stigma of the “public” label among libertarians and other groups skeptical
of governmental involvement. Of course, the governmental nature of this
plan does raise substantive issues, apart from political squeamishness.
Those issues come in at least two flavors, each the opposite of the other.
The first, and perhaps most salient fear is that any public savings plan
carries an implicit promise by the government to not allow the investments
to fail. Government bailouts of entirely private businesses are still a fresh
memory in this country, so perhaps politicians would feel even greater
pressure to prop up the savings in TSP-II should they suffer in an acute
economic downturn. The laws and charter governing a federal plan could
be drafted to make clear that such a backstop is impermissible, though such
assurances can prove very hard to enforce. So perhaps the simplest and
most effective rebuttal to this concern is the experience of the original
TSP. In the three decades of its existence, which includes several notable
market collapses, its funds have never been bailed out or augmented by
the government.
The second, opposite fear is that a public savings plan may be raided
by the government. Should the government need access to funds, the
temptation to raid a multi-trillion-dollar plan might be irresistible. Again,
the experience of the TSP is instructive: it has never been touched in its
lifetime. The reason for that impermeability may be that its funds are held
in distinct, separate accounts by each of its participants, all of whom could
see clearly whether and to what extent their personal funds had been
reduced. The distributed and disaggregated nature of defined contribution
accounts might be their best protection against an avaricious government.

45. See 2017 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 36, at 2016 Facts at a Glance.
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3. Excessive Passive Investment
Another concern about the success of a possible TSP-II would be the
acceleration of the broader trend of passive investing, inasmuch as the plan
would direct savings into indexed mutual funds. In recent years, passive
index funds have grown dramatically and now hold substantial investment
positions in many public corporations.46 The effects of this concentration
of holdings in largely automated investments are not yet clear. But one
can—and several law professors do—readily speculate about possible
malign consequences to the governance or competitive behavior of
operating companies in our economy.
One initial study suggests that large blocks of airlines stocks
concentrated in the hands of a small group of mutual funds has led to
anticompetitive behavior in that industry.47 Widespread passive
investment—such as through massive TSP-II funds—would ensure that
the stocks of S&P 500 issuers will always find a ready, indeed an
unthinkingly automatic, buyer. Managers of those firms may thus feel less
market discipline in their role as fiduciaries and entrepreneurs.48 On the
other hand, index investors also hold large positions in all the clients of
any uncompetitive firms,49 none of whom would benefit from paying
inflated prices. So, the extent to which passive investing creates an
uncompetitive landscape is far from settled.
Of course, passive investing is already on the rise,50 even in the
absence of TSP-II. And there is little reason to believe that, without a TSPII, passive investing will not continue to grow just as dramatically.
Individual investors and disparate defined contribution plans are already
avid consumers of S&P 500 index funds, ETFs, and other passive funds.51
46. See id. at 94–99; see also Chris Dieterich & Corrie Driebusch, Wall Street’s Newest Puzzle:
What Passive Buying and Selling Means for Individual Stocks, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 21, 2017), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/wall-streets-newest-puzzle-what-passive-buying-and-selling-means-forindividual-stocks-1505986202.
47. José Azar, Martin C. Schmalz & Isabel Tecu, Anti-Competitive Effects of Common
Ownership (Ross Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 1235, 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2427345
2427345 (discussed in Eric Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Mutual Funds’ Dark Side, SLATE (Apr. 16, 2015,
9:46 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2015/04/mutual_
funds_make_air_travel_more_expensive_institutional_investors_reduce.html
[https://perma.cc/
F62E-6DEB]).
48. This phenomenon has most histrionically been discussed in a report by the investment firm
Sanford C. Bernstein, entitled “The Silent Road to Serfdom: Why Passive Investing Is Worse than
Marxism.” SANFORD C. BERNSTEIN, THE SILENT ROAD TO SERFDOM: WHY PASSIVE INVESTING IS
WORSE THAN MARXISM (2016), https://www.scribd.com/document/323564709/Bernstein-PassiveInvesting-Serfdom-Aug-2016.
49. Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. CORP. L. (forthcoming
2017) (manuscript at 30), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2992046.
50. Id. at 13–18.
51. Id. at 14–15.
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So, to the extent that a massively indexed investing landscape lies in our
future, the marginal growth of that phenomenon attributable to a federal
retirement plan like TSP-II should not be overstated.
In an investment industry still dominated by actively managed funds,
the growth of passive investing appears to be more a positive development
than a pathological one. Of the 8,066 mutual funds currently offered, 7,645
are actively managed, and they impose far higher fees than their indexed
counterparts.52 Indeed, the latest developments in the exchange-traded
funds involve efforts to register and promote actively managed ETFs, an
oxymoronic and expensive solution to an unknown problem.
Even if index investing is “eating the world,”53 it has a lot of its meal
to finish—and it will do so with or without the presence of TSP-II.
III.

PROPOSAL II: STATE RETIREMENT PLANS

For those persuaded that improvements to defined contribution plans
are a good idea, at least three alternatives to TSP-II exist: multi-employer
plans, direct regulation of employers, and state-run retirement plans (using
a defined contribution rather than a defined benefit pension structure). The
first two of these options suffer significant problems of their own. Multiemployer plans require intricate coordination between disparate—even
rival—firms and come with complex regulation. Command regulation
requiring employers to establish and mimic a TSP-II in their own defined
contribution plans would involve uncomfortably heavy-handed federal
interference in private operations, and would almost certainly forfeit the
chief advantage of large economies of scale. Accordingly, I will focus on
the state plan alternative.
As it happens, a certain amount of ferment already exists at the state
level—perhaps too much. Approximately half a dozen states are
considering or have already enacted legislation authorizing a TSP-like
defined contribution plan at the state level. One of them, California, is the
Union’s largest economy and is also furthest along this path. Governor
Brown recently signed a law establishing a plan entitled California Secure
Choice (CSC), which went into effect on January 1, 2017.54
52. 2017 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 36, at 95 fig. 5.6 (reporting 421 index
mutual funds in 2016), 96 fig. 5.7 (reporting average fees of 0.82% and 0.58% for actively managed
equity and bond mutual funds respectively, compared to average fees of 0.09% and 0.07% for index
equity and bond mutual funds, respectively), 170 tbl. 1 (reporting 8,066 total funds).
53. Jason Zweig, Are Index Funds Eating the World?, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 26, 2016, 11:46 AM),
https://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2016/08/26/are-index-funds-eating-the-world/.
54. See Sophia Bollag & Samantha Masunaga, Nearly 7 Million Californians Will Be
Automatically Enrolled in State-Run Retirement Savings Plan Under New Law, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 29,
2016, 2:10 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-retirement-program-20160929-snap-

2018]

Federalism of Personal Finance

381

The new law requires California employers with more than five
employees and no retirement plans of their own to enroll that population
of 7.5 million employees automatically in CSC.55 Those employers were
originally scheduled, beginning in 2018, to contribute three percent of
covered employees’ salaries automatically to CSC, with automatic annual
escalations of one percent to a maximum of eight percent.56 The details of
some of these provisions have come into doubt, however, because of
recent federal legislation that curtails the ability of state retirement plans
to use automatic enrollment.57 Nevertheless, legislators in California and
other states have announced their intention to proceed regardless of the
new federal impediment.58
Employers are not obliged to match employee contributions, and
employees can opt out or alter these default settings.59 Their CSC accounts
will follow them to any future jobs they hold, at least within California.
Like TSP, the plan will be overseen by a state board of officials, while
investment and administrative services will be outsourced to private
vendors.60 In effect, CSC is quite true to the TSP, just at a state level. The
largest difference is that the enacting legislation contemplates that CSC
assets will be invested only in Treasury securities, not mutual funds.61
Other states, including Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, Oregon, and Washington, are contemplating

story.html. For coverage of Maryland’s plan, see Noah Weiland, Nest Eggs for Job Hoppers, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 5, 2017, at F2.
55. California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Trust Act, 2012 Cal. Stat. ch. 734 (codified as
amended at CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 100000–100044 (West 2016)); OFFICE STATE TREASURER CAL.,
CALIFORNIA SECURE CHOICE FACT SHEET, http://treasurer.ca.gov/scib/fact.pdf [https://perma.cc/
ES7Z-K4WX].
56. California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Trust Act, 2012 Cal. Stat. ch. 734 (codified as
amended at CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 100000–100044 (West 2016)); OFFICE STATE TREASURER CAL.,
supra note 55.
57. In March 2017, “[b]y a single vote, the Senate gave final approval . . . to a measure to block
cities and counties from organizing retirement savings accounts for workers who have no access to
employer-sponsored plans,” which it did “using the 1996 Congressional Review Act, which had hardly
been used in the two decades before Mr. Trump’s inauguration.” Noah Weiland, Senate Narrowly
Passes Rollback of Obama-Era ‘Auto-I.R.A.’ Rule, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.
nytimes.com/2017/03/30/business/labor-department-retirement-savings-account.html
(discussing
federal repeal legislation, H.R.J. Res. 66, 115th Cong. (2017) and H.R.J. Res. 67, 115th Cong. (2017)).
58. Kathleen Pender, California Fights to Keep State-Run Retirement Option, S.F. CHRON. (Feb.
16, 2017), http://www.sfchronicle.com/business/networth/article/California-fights-to-keep-state-runretirement-10939150.php [https://perma.cc/75A5-NLCM].
59. Id.
60. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100046 (West 2017).
61. Id.
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variants of similar plans.62 So would a federalism of finance work better
than a national TSP-II?
A. Potential Benefits
1. Immediacy
As the passage and schedule of CSC demonstrates, one benefit of
pursuing a state approach is the possible immediacy of enactment. The
coordination problems and general sclerosis of our federal political
apparatus—at least in recent years—suggest that a federal approach may
be many years distant. A Trump administration, with a compliant Senate
and House, might possibly follow Senator Rubio’s initiative and endorse
such a plan more quickly.63 But early evidence suggests that the one-party
rule has not made the passage of legislation much easier. Also, retirement
security was featured very little as a topic of policy in the recent
presidential campaign and, even if attractive to the new administration, it
does not yet seem to be a top priority. So, speed of enactment and
implementation certainly is an advantage of pursuing this idea at the state
level.
2. Experimentation
Of course, the classic chestnut of federalism—that the state petri
dishes permit experimentation—is as true on this subject as it so often is.
With states varying their offerings, as their initial legislation suggests they
are doing, we could study the effects of large versus small menus of
offerings, aggressive versus conservative investment choices, and ETFs
versus mutual funds, as well as the comparative performance of a wide
range of asset managers. Indeed, a federalist approach could nurture a far
broader population of plan managers—and certainly not pose anything
like the winner-take-all monopsony risks present with a single, national
TSP-II.

62. Richard H. Thaler, State I.R.A. Plans Are Ready, if Congress Doesn’t Interfere, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/03/upshot/state-ira-plans-are-ready-if-congressdoesnt-interfere.html; PENSION RIGHTS CENTER, State-Based Retirement Plans for the Private Sector,
http://www.pensionrights.org/issues/legislation/state-based-retirement-plans-private-sector [https://
perma.cc/2A2F-ZTNW]. See Ashlea Ebeling, Small Business Retirement Plan Mandates Coming In
2017, FORBES (Sept. 13, 2016 8:22 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ashleaebeling/
2016/09/13/when-will-new-state-retirement-plans-start-enrollment/#50e9b5287e0f
[https://perma.cc/NS7E-ZYSC].
63. Hicks, supra note 37.
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B. Possible Drawbacks
1. Lesser Economies of Scale & Higher Fees
One of the largest problems with a state system is the dramatic drop
in possible economies of scale. Dividing the assets of eligible employees
into fifty different buckets will ensure that each bucket is significantly
smaller than a federal cistern. Implementation and administrative costs,
duplicated fifty different times, will represent a far greater aggregate
expense in a multi-state system. Nevertheless, some states, such as
California, may possess sufficient numbers of participants and assets to
yield far better investment options than their citizens currently enjoy. So,
on the question of financial benefit alone, state plans are likely not to be
as compelling as a single federal plan but are still likely to be a significant
improvement over the status quo.
2. Balkanization & Lock-In
A second, perhaps more intractable, problem with a state approach is
the barriers it would impose on the mobility of citizens within the United
States. California, after all, can compel only Californian employers to
participate in its Secure Choice plan. So, a worker interested in leaving
California would need to establish a new account in a different state for
future contributions while maintaining the CSC account. A balkanized
patchwork of savings plans would increase friction upon employee
mobility. Employees would have to research and consider the relative
merits of different retirement regimes in each of the different states they
consider for employment. Economies and individuals rarely benefit in the
midst of such frictions.64
One possible solution might be for states to agree to reciprocally
transfer savings between their plans when citizens move across borders.
But, as we have already seen in the initial handful of state proposals, these
plans might have incommensurate attributes that would highly complicate
such transfers. The Massachusetts plan, for instance, proposes to cover

64. Some critics believe the proliferation of state-based regimes for 529 savings plans for
education expenses suffer from a similar problem. With each state offering its own variation of a 529
plan, parents of future college matriculants must navigate among dozens of possible options to find an
investment solution. See, e.g., Austan Goolsbee, The “529” Rip-Off, SLATE (Aug. 23, 2002, 5:16 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2002/08/the_529_ripoff.html; Howard Isenstein,
As College Plans Proliferate, It Pays to Shop Around, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2004), http://
www.nytimes.com/2004/06/20/business/sunday-money-saving-as-college-plans-proliferate-it-paysto-shop-around.html.
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only employees of non-profit corporations.65 The California plan, as we
saw, invests only in Treasury bills,66 while others will almost certainly
include broader arrays of choice. Even in the unlikely circumstance
involving perfectly identical state plans, legislators or officials of the state
must engage in bargaining to arrive at a compromise, or the federal
government might be required, once again, to legislate recognition of the
full faith and credit of state plans.
3. Complexity
With experimentation, of course, comes added complexity. And, to
negotiate a state-based system, citizens will need to learn the varying
details of many ostensibly similar but substantively disparate plans. Many
systems—regulatory and tax, for example—impose such complexity
already, but the existence of some is not an argument for adding more
(particularly not when a federal alternative exists). Indeed, calls by both
industry groups and consumers in various settings for federal preemption
of state regimes might be predictably echoed here.
4. Local Naïveté & Pay-to-Play
State-based plans may also be afflicted by local operatives who are
either too naïve or too canny. As is often the case with the human resources
departments of smaller corporations, the state officials in charge of
administering defined contribution plans may simply lack the expertise to
decide or oversee critical components of their plans. Consider, for
instance, one element of CSC: the plan imposes a cap of one percent on
administrative costs.67 To a layperson, one percent may seem like a very
low fee. Within the investing industry, however, fees of one percent or 100
basis points are exorbitant, particularly in the context of very large pools
of assets such as these. And, California is sure to be one of the most
sophisticated and powerful states in this field. One might reasonably fear
that some state plans will be taken advantage of by, for instance,
investment advisors that invest expensively or charge inordinate
administrative costs. Indeed, many such firms have spent many of the past
few years defending lawsuits alleging precisely such behavior in the
defined contribution plans of employers—and, on occasion, in their own
plans.

65. An Act Providing Retirement Options for Nonprofit Organizations, 2012 Mass. Acts 100–
02 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 29, § 64E (2013)).
66. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100002(e)(1)(A) (West 2017).
67. Id. § (d).
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Conversely, state officials have at times been all-too-cute regarding
the management of public savings. In New York, for instance, and most
prominently, officials have been prosecuted for pay-to-play schemes with
public pension funds.68 Officials have solicited bribes in exchange for the
appointment of friendly asset managers—often woefully inexperienced,
inexpert, or prone to charge too much—to the lucrative position of
managing state pension funds. With as many as fifty different plans to
monitor, it may be hard for public watchdogs to police this behavior
throughout the nation. And even with close scrutiny, politicians will surely
feel some pressure to appoint politically supportive financial firms to
manage what are sure to be large pools of savings.
CONCLUSION
The merits of a federal savings plan outweigh those of a state-based
system, and the presence of any system is certainly superior to none. The
actions by California and other states may, alas, interfere with the impetus
of federal actors to pursue a national plan. To date, the greatest
impediment to states moving forward with their plans has been federal
legislation just introduced by Republican congressional representatives
opposed to state plans.69 If there is a legislative lull, perhaps the state
initiatives will, more optimistically, serve as a goad to federal actors to
move quickly to forestall a spreading patchwork of plans. Perhaps the
poorest outcome is the status quo, in which pensions have been eliminated
from the U.S. private sector and in which we now impede meaningful
efforts by workers to combine their bargaining power to improve the
health of their retirement savings.

68. See, e.g., Steven Davidoff Solomon, After Scandals, Evaluating Pension Funds’ Middleman,
N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/13/business/dealbook/after-pay-toplay-scandals-evaluating-pension-funds-middleman.html?mcubz=1.
69. See Reid Wilson, Congress Takes Aim at State Retirement Accounts, HILL (Feb. 15, 2017,
1:13 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/319686-congress-takes-aim-at-state-retirementaccounts [https://perma.cc/MVU4-SVT3]; see also Editorial Board, Repealing Labor’s Double
Standard, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/repealing-labors-doublestandard-1488241102.

